Slavens v. Slavens Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 43743 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-25-2016
Slavens v. Slavens Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43743
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Slavens v. Slavens Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43743" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 6151.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6151
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JAMES ADAM SLAVENS, ALEXA ST ,A VENS and TANNER SLAVENS, 




MELANIE SLAVENS, both personally and as administrator of the Estate of 
James Kenneth Slavens, 
Respondent-Appellant 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Bonneville 
County. 
Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, presiding. 
William A. Parsons and Randolph C. Stone 
Parsons, Smith, Stone, Loveland & Shirley, LLP 
Residing at Burley, for Appellant 
John Simmons 
John Simmons JD LLM Prof Co 
Residing at Idaho Falls, for Respondents. 
FILED .. COPY 
MAR 2 5 2016 
SuprerueCoorL.......Coert ·' """M~ 
Entered on ATS by 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Adam James Slavens, Alexa Slavens and / Supreme Court No. 43743 
Tanner Slavens, and Twin G Holdings, District Court Case No. CV 2013-5552 
LLC (derivatively), 
Petitioners below /Respondents, 
vs. 
Melanie Slavens, both personally and as 
administrator of the Estate of James 
Kenneth Slavens, 
Res ondent below/Petitioner. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR BGNNEVILLE COUNTY 
HONORABLE JON J. SHINDURLING, PRESIDING 
JOHN SIMMONS 
John Simmons JD LLM Prof Co 
796 Memorial Drive 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Attorney for Petitioners-Respondents 
WILLIAM A. PARSONS 
RANDOLPH C. STONE 
Parsons, Smith, Stone, Loveland 
& Shirley LLP 
137 West 13th Street 
PO Box 910 
Burley, Idaho 83318 
Attorney for Respondent-Appellant 
I. Statement of the 1 
B. Course of the Proceedings ............................................................................................... 1 
C. Request for Respondents' Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal ................................ -3 
D. Statement of Facts ............................................................................................................ 3 
II. 10 
A. Idaho Courts have Jurisdiction to Decide O\vnership and Control of 
Idaho Limited Liability Companies, Despite a Deceased Manager/Member's 
Estate Already being Probated Elsewhere .................................................................... 11 
1. The General Jurisdiction ofidaho Courts Includes Jurisdiction to 
Determine Who are the Rightful O\\<Tiers, Members and Managers 
of an Idaho 
2. In Deciding to Retain the Case Despite the Utah Probate Proceeding, 
the District Court Perceived the RULE 12(b)(8) Issue as One of Discretion 
and the Proper Factors and Standards to Consider, and Explained its 
11 
Reasoned Application of that Discretion in the Context of Those Standards .... 13 
B. Johnny Slavens Properly Held the 99% and Was an LLC Member 
Under the Idaho Limited Liability Company from the LLC's Inception ................. 16 
C. Johnny Slavens' Testimony about Jim Slavens' Statements are Not 
Excluded by the Deadman Statute ................................................................................. 22 
D. The Oral Trust Here that Jim Slavens Placed in Johnny Slavens 
re the 99% is Legally Valid and Enforceable .............................................................. .25 
1. Ownership of an LLC is Personal PropertY ........................................................... .25 
. i . 
2. Idaho Law Recognizes Oral Trusts over Personal Property ............................... .26 
3. The Trust Here Meets the Four Requirements for Validitv ................................ .27 
E. Jo:hnny Slav'ens Yet Held the 99% in Tr11st \vhen Jim Slavens died 
Because Jim Died Never having Used the Signed 2011 Amended 
Certificate as Required by JohnnY ................................................................................ .27 
I. Johnny Slavens Sent the Signed 2011 Amended Certificate 
to Jim Slavens with the Intent that It Not Then Operate 
to Transfer the 99%, and Jim Died Never Having Used It, 
Never Having Triggered the Transfer of OwnershiP ........................................... .28 
2. Jim Slavens Did Not Use the 2011 Amended Certificate Before He Died; 
Johnny Slavens' Condition on Delivery Failed oflmpossibility; Johnny 
Continued to Hold the 99%; Melanie Slavens Never Became a Manager 
(nor Member) of the 1 
3. Melanie Slavens Has Never Legally Become a Member of the LLC ................ .33 
4. Melanie Slavens Has Never Legally Been an LLC Manager; Adam, 
Alexa and Tanner Slavens are the Only Members and Adam the Only 
Manager of the LLC .................................................................................................. 34 
F. Adam, Alexa and Tanner Slavens Request and Are Entitled 
to Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal.. ....................................................................... .36 
IV. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 38 
Certificate of Service and Certificate of Compliance Page 
- ii . 
CASES PAGE(s) 
April Beguesse Inc v. Rammell, 156 Idaho 500, 515, 
328 P.3d 480,495 (2014L ................................................................................................. 23, 24 
Argyle v. Slemaker, 99 Idaho 544, 585 P.2d 954 (1978) ................................................. 23, 24 
Ayers v Cook, Docket No. S15A1611 (GA Sup. Court February 22, 2016) ........................ 21 
Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 344, 179 P.3d 303, 307 (2008) ............................ .28-30 
Bliss v. Bliss, 20 Idaho 467,476, 119 P. 451,454 (1911) ..................................................... .27 
Bowers v. Cottrell, 15 Idaho 221,228, 96 P. 936, 938 (1908} ............................................. .28 
Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 379 146 P.3d 639, 645 (2006) ......................................... .27 
Conner v. Hodges, 157 Idaho 19, 23, 333 P.3d 130, 134 (2014) .......................................... 16 
Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 68 Idaho 470,476, 199 P2d 264,267 (1948} ................................ 30 
Diet Ctr., Inc. v. Basford, 124 Idaho 20, 22-23, 855 P.2d 481, 
483-84 (Ct.App. 1993) .............................................................................................................. 14 
Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 74-75, 
785 P.2d 634, 638-639 (Idaho 1990L ................................................................................... .36 
Edgar v. A1ITE Corporation., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982L .................................................... .15 
Farrell v. Mc Vey, 71 Idaho 339,232 P.2d 134 (1951) .................................................... 24, 25 
Flynn v. Flynn, 17 Idaho 147, 160, 104 P. 1030, 1034 (1909) .............................................. 26 
Garner v. Andreasen, 96 Idaho 306, 308, 527 P.2d 1264, 1266 (1974) .............................. .32 
Garrett v. Garrett, 154 Idaho 788,791,302 P.3d 1061, 1064 (2013) ........................... .28-30 
Golub v. Kirk-Hughes Dev., LLC, 158 Idaho 73, 75-76, 
343 P.3d 1080, 1082-83 (2015L ............................................................................................ 16 
Gomez, State v., 126 Idaho 700, 704, 889 P.2d 729, 733 (Ct.App. 1994) ........................... .25 
Hartley v. Stibor, 96 Idaho 157, 160, 525 P.2d 352, 355 (1974L ........................................ 30 
Hoagland v. Ada Cnty., 154 Idaho 900, 906, 303 P.3d 587, 593 (2013} ............................. 26 
Hull (Estate of) v. Williams, 126 Idaho 437,443, 
885 P.2d 1153, 1159 (Ct.App. 1994) ............................................................................... 26, 27 
Humphries v. Becker, Idaho Supreme Court 2016 Opinion No. 5 (1/22/2016} ................. .16 
Klaue v. Hern, 133 Idaho 437,439, 988 P.2d 211,213 (1999) ..................................... .14, 36 
Keeven, Estate of, 110 Idaho 452,460, 716 P.2d 1224, 1232 (1986L ........ eo •••••••••••••••• 23, 24 
Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 
591 P.2d 1078, 1086 (1979) .................................................................................................... .36 
1'1.1ontgome1y v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 8,205 P.3d 650,657 (2009L ................... 27, 28 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co, 339 U.S. 306, 313-14(1950) ................... .11 
Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 746, 
152 P.3d 614, 617 (2007) ......................................................................................................... 35 
Rowan v. Riley, 139 Idaho 49, 54, 72 P.3d 889, 894 (2003) ................................................. .24 
. iii . 
151 Idaho 863, 970, (2011 
Skvorak, Estate of, 140 Idaho 16, 21, 80 P.3d 856, 861 (2004) ___________________________________________ _29 
Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 
803 P.2d 993, 1000 (199 3 
Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dept. of Administration, Idaho Supreme Court 2016 
Whitney v. Dewey, IO Idaho 633, 655, 80 P. 1117, 1121 (1905).__ ________________________________________ 30 
Zaleha v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, Chtd., 129 Idaho 532, 533, 
927 P .2d 925, 926 ( Ct.App.1996).__ _________________________________________________________________________________________ 13 
STATUTES 
IDAHO CODE § 1-705(1) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------11 
IDAHO CODE §9-202(3)_·--·--·---·---------------------------------------------------------------·----------·-····-·----------·22, 23 
IDAHO CODE §9-503 
ID AH o Co DE § 9-5 o 5 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 26 
IDAHO CODE §30-6-1104(2) _·--------------------------------------------------------·--------·····-·············----------17, 26 
IDAHO CODE §30-25-102( a)(9) ·------------------------------------------------------------------------------------l 7, 19, 26 
IDAHO CODE §30-25-102( a)( 11 )------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------33 
IDAHO CODE §30-25-407(c)(4) 35 
IDAHO CODE §3 0-25-407 ( c )( 5) _______ ·------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------34 
IDAHO CODE §30-25-41 O(g) __ ·-----··---·--···--···--····--·-·······----------------------------··---······--·····----------------33 
IDAHO CODE §3 0-25-502( a )(3 )(A )--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 3 
IDAHO CODE §30-25-502(b) _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 33 
IDAHO Co DE § 3 0-2 5-5 02( d) ... ---------------------------------------------------- _ ------------ -------·- ---------- _ ----------- ____ 26 
ID AHO CODE § 3 0-25-5 02(g) _______________________________________ ------ __________ --------------- _____________ --------------- _____ 3 3 
IDAHO CODE §30-25-504(2) _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 33 
IDAHO CODE §53-601 (11) (2005) ______________________________________________________________________________________________ l 7 
IDAHO CODE §53-635 (2005) _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 26 
IDAHO CODE §53-640(1 )(a) (2005)__ _________________________________________________________________________________________ 17 
IDAHO CODE §53-640( 1 )(b) (2005) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------17 
UT AH CODE § 7 5-3-804 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 11 
RULES 
I.A.R. 11 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 36 
I.A.R 0, 36 
I.A.R. 4 0,_36 
I.R.C.P. 12(b )(8) __ ·------------·-·······-----------------------------------------------------------------------------··-···-··---···13, 14 
I.R.C.P. 54(b ) _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 3 
- iv -
OTHER 
Restatement (Second) of Co11f1ict ofLavvs §302, comment b (1971). ____________________ ~~-----·12, 13 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts §24·······----·-·--·--·-···--------------------·-----·····-·-··--··-------·················_26 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts §23···························-·······-·-···-················-···--··············-··--······_26 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts §§20, 22, 23 and 24····················-·-··-·················--·-·-················27 
1 G. G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts of Trustees, §45 (Revised 2d ed. 1984 L .... _ ............... .27 
-v 
-6 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is about who are the rightful owners of 99% of Twin G Holdings, LLC ("the 
LLC"), as \Veil as its rightfi1I members and manager~ Ninety-nine percent of the O\Vnership--
"transferrable interest"--of the LLC ("99%") was held by John C. Slavens ("Johnny") at the 
request of and for his brother, James Kenneth Slavens ("Jim") when he set up the LLC in June 
2005. (For continuity with the use by the trial court in the orders being appealed, the references 
in this brief are "Jim" and "Johnny" rather than "James" and "John" as used in Appellant's Brief 
for the same persons.) Jim held the other l %; his estate now owns that 1 %. 
Jim's instructions to Johnny were that on Jim's death, Johnny was to distribute the 99% 
to Jim's three oldest children from his first marriage, i.e., the Respondents on appeal, James 
Adam Slavens ("Adam"), Alexa Slavens ("Alexa") and Tanner Slavens ("Tanner"). 
The primary legal questions posed by this case are whether Johnny in fact held the 99% 
and had, before Jim died, transferred that 99% to Jim and his second wife and now widow, 
Appellant, Melanie Slavens ("Melanie"). That second question turns on whether Jim fulfilled 
the condition that Johnny placed on delivery of a document Johnny signed and sent to Jim 19 
months before he died. Johnny's condition was that Jim himself must use that document. Jim 
died without ever having done so. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Jim and Johnny were the only two LLC members. Jim was the only LLC manager. He 
died on December 12, 2012, leaving Johnny as the sole remaining LLC member and the LLC 
without a manager. Despite Johnny being the sole LLC member and Melanie herself not being 
either an owner, a member or manager of the LLC, she seized control of the LLC and its assets 
1 
State 
also as an LLC member, and in this action to be an owner. 
as manager 
To re-claim their beneficial rights in the 99% held by Johnny for them, Adam, Alexa and 
Tanner initiated the action below in October 2013. R. 14-28. Melanie appeared and moved to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The district court found that it has jurisdiction and denied the 
motion on February 27, 2014. R. 119-129. Melanie then answered the petition. R. 130-37. 
Respondents took Melanie's deposition (R. 195-240), followed by asking her to admit 
certain matters. With Melanie's testimony, her admissions (R. 242-251) and an affidavit from 
Johnny (R. 146-185), Adam, Alexa and Tanner moved for partial summary judgment. Melanie 
opposed the motion, claiming Johnny had, before Jim died, transferred the 99% to Jim and 
Melanie. On November 30, 2014, the district court found and ruled that Johnny's conditional 
delivery had failed of impossibility when Jim died. The district court declared that when Jim 
died, Johnny yet held the 99% in trust, then for Adam, Alexa and Tanner, they were the only 
rightful LLC members and since Jim died, Adam has been its only rightful manager. R. 405-417. 
Melanie swiftly moved for reconsideration. She signed and filed a second affidavit. 
R. 421-446. In the new affidavit, Melanie contradicted her own prior deposition testimony and 
first affidavit. Melanie's new 'testimony' is that Johnny had never become an LLC member and 
never did hold the 99% at issue here. She now claims that she and Jim were 50-50% owners and 
that she never intended to gift away her 50%. 
The district court refused Melanie's new statements "because they dramatically 
contradict her earlier affidavit testimony without justification". The new testimony "is not new 
2 
now a 
Denying Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, May 21, 2015, R. 537-49. 
The district court entered a Judgment on October 19, 2015 (R. 573-75) reflecting its 
November 2014 judicial declarations, reiterated in its May 2015 decision as we! I. Although just 
a few, wrap up issues remain unresolved below, the district court certified the partial Judgment 
as 'final' and appealable under IDAHO RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 54(b ), R. 564-72. Adam, Alexa 
and Tanner submit this, their Respondent's Brief, in response to Melanie's appeal and briefing. 
C. REQUEST FOR RESPONDENTS' COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
For the reasons discussed below in this brief, Adam, Alexa and Tanner believe that they 
will be the prevailing party. They request, as the Respondents, an award of their costs and 
attorney's fees on appeal. 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Jim resided in Utah where he practiced law. Melanie worked in Jim's office as a legal 
assistant. Since before his marriage to Melanie, Jim had held a judgment against Rocky Atwood 
of Kuna, Idaho. Jim was in June 2005 obtaining the title to Atwood's Kuna house ("the Kuna 
house"). This was in part a satisfaction of Jim's judgment lien. 1st Affidavit of John C Slavens, 
August 15, 2013, ,r6, R. 147. (Note, this is the only testimony from Johnny in the litigation.) 
Jim set up the LLC with the Idaho Secretary of State, under the Idaho Limited Liability 
Company Act, to receive and hold title to the Kuna house in the LLC's name. When setting up 
the LLC in June 2005, Jim asked his brother Johnny to hold 99% ownership in the LLC for the 
benefit of Jim. Jim would own the other 1 %. Jim instructed Johnny that upon Jim's death, 
Johnny was to distribute the 99% to Jim's oldest three children, from his first marriage: Adam, 
3 
Tanner. I C ,rs, 9, 10 11. 
Jim had an operating agreement drafted for the LLC that so specified Johnny as having 99% 
"Ownership interest/sharing ratio" to Jim's I%, listing both of them as LLC members but only 
Jim as its manager. R. 149, 154-178 (in particular, 177). Melanie has admitted that the unsigned 
Operating Agreement accurately reflected Jim's desires for the LLC from its organization unti I at 
least April 2011. Deposition of Melanie Ann Slavens, P54, L10-P55, L2. R. 205. 
Almost four years later, Jim and Johnny's business relations became strained over a deal 
outside of the LLC. Johnny and Jim were sued over irregularities of a mortgage foreclosure sale 
Jim handled for the bank. At Jim's request, Johnny as a strawman for Jim bid on and purchased 
a farm in Delta, Utah. Johnny then quit-claimed the Delta farm over to Jim. Jim did not record 
that quit-claim deed for 14 months, just holding onto it. As Johnny's name remained on the 
record title, he and Jim were both sued over the foreclosure sale irregularities. Deposition of 
Melanie Ann Slavens, June 18, 2014, P64, Ll 1-P69, Ll3. (R. 207-08). 
Johnny was upset about being sued over a deal in which he had just been accommodating 
Jim's desires. Jim negotiated a settlement of that lawsuit for both himself and Johnny in late 
April 2011. Johnny insisted Jim allow Johnny to talk to the farm debtors before signing the 
settlement agreement. Jim did not want Johnny talking to those farm debtors. Over the course 
of three days (April 21-23, 2011), Jim and Johnny conversed by telephone and e-mail about how 
to resolve the situation between them. Their discussions also included Johnny's involvement in 
the LLC (holding the 99% in trust). 
Jim drafted and sent Johnny an 'addendum' regarding the LLC on April 21, 2011. It 
recites quite clearly that Johnny held 99% and Jim 1 % of the LLC, but had it been signed by 
4 
then 
Exhibit 5 to the Deposition of Melanie Ann Slavens, P42, Ll-P43, L2, R. 204. 
That evening Johnny wrote to Jim about his hesitations in signing: "I'm not mad, I just 
need to absolutely avoid" situations like that of the Delta farm and lawsuit. Second tabled e-mail 
entry on page I ofExhibit4 (R. 226) to the Deposition of Melanie Ann Slavens, PIO, L21-Pll, 
L4. R. 197. Jim had second thoughts about the Addendum, and asked Johnny to hold off signing 
it. The addendum was never signed. 
Jim drafted and sent different, replacement documents to Johnny the next day (April 22, 
2011). The document Jim replaced the addendum with was a completed form from the Idaho 
Secretary of State's office: "Amendment to Certificate of Existence/Limited Liability 
Company." As completed and proposed by Jim to Johnny, see Exhibit 11, Deposition of 
Melanie Ann Slavens, P78, L10-P80, L2I, R. 211). It is this 2011 Amended Certificate that lies 
at the crux of this case. Although not designed for use as a document to transfer ownership in an 
LLC, Jim had filled that form out so that if signed and delivered by Johnny, Jim would own 75% 
and Melanie 25%. And if it had been filed with the Idaho Secretary of State, Johnny would be 
deleted as a manager (though he was never listed as one in any prior document) and Melanie 
would have been added as a manager alongside Jim. Id. 
On April 22, 201 1, Jim asked Johnny to sign and send the 2011 Amended Certificate 
back to Jim. Jim explained that if Johnny signed and sent it back to Jim, then Jim would not 
need Jimmy to sign anything further in the future. With it, Jim could alone take steps to 
rearrange his estate planning to make sure Adam, Alexa and Tanner received the 99%. Johnny 
understood that in addition to use for rearranging his estate planning, Jim also wanted the signed 
s 
to prove he have not own 
the 99%. Either way Jim might have used the signed 2011 Amended Certificate, Johnny would 
upon its use be "out of" the LLC. 1st Affidavit of John C Slavens, 116. R. 149. 
In wrapping up their 3-day conversation on April 23, 2011, Jim wrote Johnny: "You 
haven't mentioned signing the addendum to the Twin G Holdings. Can you sign that and send it, 
so I can get you out of that? That has nothing to do with the Delta property" over which the 
foreclosure irregularity lawsuit had been filed (Deposition of Melanie Ann Slavens, Exhibit 4, 
April 23, 10:36AM tabled entry, R. 197, 230). It was the 2011 Amended Certificate rather than 
the 'addendum' that Johnny signed and sent to Jim. 
Johnny signed the 2011 Amended Certificate and sent it to Jim on the condition that it 
was for Jim's use only. 1st Affidavit of John C Slavens, 1115, 17 and 27, R. 149-51 (as signed by 
Johnny, see Id., Exhibit 7, P59, L5-P60, L3, R. 206). 
The other documents Jim sent Johnny, one on April 21, 2011 and then a replacement of it 
on April 22, 2011, were quit claim deeds to the Delta farm. In the end, Jim realized he did not 
need Johnny to sign either of them. Jim could simply record the signed quit claim deed from 
Johnny that Jim had been holding February 2010. Jim did not record it until May 5, 2011, 
transferring the Delta farm to himself. Jim then filed another quit claim deed he had signed, 
transferring the Delta farm into the LLC. 
Jim never did use the signed 2011 Amended Certificate that Johnny signed and sent to 
Jim. It remained unused, tucked away in Jim's personal file that he kept on the LLC for 19 
months. Jim died on December 12, 2012 never having used the 2011 Amended Certificate. Jim 
6 
sent it to State to Ann 
Ll7-19, R. 210. 
In those 19 months, Jim did file two annual reports for the LLC with the Idaho Secretary 
of State, one on July 26, 2011 (Id., P73, Ll3-l 9, Exhibit 10, R. 209 and 235) and the other on 
April 21, 2012 (Id., P93, L2-P94, L4, Exhibit 15, R. 214-15 and 239). In neither did Jim list 
Melanie as a manager. Nor did Jim file the 2011 Amended Certificate along with either of those 
annual reports that he filed while holding the 2011 Amended Certificate in his files, unused. 
In that time, Jim also caused the LLC to sell the Delta farm. Juab Title requested on 
November 23, 2011 proof that Jim could sign the sale documents for the LLC. Melanie testified 
that, on Jim's request, she retrieved for him the entire file Jim kept on the LLC. That file 
included the 2011 Amended Certificate as signed by Johnny. Deposition of Melanie Ann 
Slavens, P80, L22-P90, L7 (R. 211-14), specifically, P86, L7-17 (R. 213). From Jim's file, he 
could have faxed the recently signed 2011 Amended Certificate to Juab Title to prove his LLC 
authority. That might have resulted in Juab Title requiring Melanie's signature also. Instead, 
Jim dug deeper into his file, found the much older 2005 Articles of Organization that lists only 
Jim as a manager. That is what Jim faxed to Juab Title. Id., Exhibit 14, P80, L22-P88, L20, 
R. 211-13 and 237-38. 
Those were the only three occasions on which Jim provided documents about whom was 
the LLC's manager during the 19 months he was holding the signed 2011 Amended Certificate 
in his file. On each of those three occasions, Jim could have but did not use that signed 2011 
Amended Certificate nor did he ever list or indicate that Melanie was a manager of the LLC. 
7 
never the on never 
used the 2011 Amended Certificate. 
Melanie testified about the July 26, 2011 annual report (Id., Exhibit 10, R. 235)-the first 
one after Johnny mailed the signed 2011 Amended Certificate to Jim (Id., P74, Ll9-P75, Ll9, 
R. 21 O; emphasis added): 
Q. And when Jim filed that on July 26, 2011, he listed the managers, at least one member 
or manager, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he just listed himself as the manager? 
A. Yes. He's always listed himself as the manager. 
Q. And he didn't list you at that time? 
A. No. 
* * * 
Q. So this would have been after he [Jim] would have received Exhibit 7 [R. 234], the 
signed [2011] amended certificate for the LLC, from Johnny, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he didn't list you as manager? 
A. I wasn't the manager; he was. 
Q. And he didn't file Exhibit 7 before he died, did he, with the Secretary of State's 
office? 
A. No, he didn't. 
Melanie readily concedes that she does "not know whether or not Jim took any other 
steps than to put" the signed 201 I Amended Certificate in his personal files. Melanie admits she 
has "no way of knowing or ascertaining the same as Jim is deceased." Melanie's verified 
Response to Request for Admission ##7 and 13, R. 244-45. Melanie was asked if she knew of 
any documents that showed that Jim had used the 2011 Amended Certificate. Melanie answered, 
"No, obviously not." Deposition of Melanie Ann Slavens, P 90, L 2-7, R. 214. 
8 
One Jim on 9, 20 
owned the 99%. Deposition of Melanie Ann Slavens, P134, Ll4-P139, LI, R. 219-20. Melanie 
defiantly claimed that she and Jim owned the LLC. Deposition of Melanie Ann Slavens, Pl 40, 
LI 7-P142, L6, R. 220-21. 
Undaunted by Johnny's claim to the 99%, two weeks later Melanie pulled the 2011 
Amended Certificate bearing Johnny's signature from Jim's files and sent it to the Idaho 
Secretary of State to be filed (it was filed on January 3, 2013). She admits she did not have 
Johnny's permission to use or file the 2011 Amended Certificate bearing his signature (Exhibit 7 
to the Deposition of Melanie Ann Slavens, P59, L5-P60, L3, R. 206; Melanie's verified 
Response to Request for Admission #23, R. 248). Since then, Melanie has nevertheless exerted 
control over the LLC and its assets. 
Johnny was the only LLC member after Jim died. Johnny signed and delivered 
documents to Adam, Alexa and Tanner on August 15, 2013. By those documents, Johnny 
(i) appointed Adam as the LLC manager and admitted Adam, Alexa and Tanner as LLC 
members, (ii) transferred the 99% to Adam, Alexa and Tanner and then (iii) resigned his own 
LLC membership, having completed his duties as trustee as Jim had asked and instructed him. 
Exhibit JCS-3 (R. 151 and 180-81) and Exhibit JCS-4 (R. 151 and 182-85) to the 1st Affidavit of 
John C Slavens. 
This litigation was then initiated with the district court. Adam, Alexa and Tanner have 
requested that they be judicially declared to be the rightful owners of the 99% and the LLC's 
only members, and Adam its rightful manager. The district court has so found and declared by 
9 
its 14 on 1, 20 5 in 
motion for reconsideration (R. 537-49). 
11. ISSUES 
A. Do Idaho courts have jurisdiction to decide ownership and control of an LLC organized and 
existing under the IDAHO LIMITED LIABILITY COA1PANY ACT where a probate proceeding for the 
LLC's manager and one of the LLC members has already been opened in another state? 
B. Had Johnny properly acquired the 99% (as trustee) and become an LLC member along with 
Jim under the Idaho Limited Liability Company Act in 2005? 
C. Are the statements that Johnny, in his affidavit, ascribes to Jim having made to Johnny in 
setting up the oral trust and about the 2011 Amended Certificate admissible despite the 
Deadman Statute? 
D. Did an oral trust exist when Jim (as settlor) asked Johnny to hold the 99% for Jim, and after 
he died, to then distribute the 99% to Jim's three oldest children, Adam, Alexa and Tanner? 
E. Did Johnny yet hold the 99% in trust when Jim died because Johnny's condition on delivery 
of the signed 2011 Amended Certificate failed due to impossibility when Jim died never 
having used it? 
F. Are Adam, Alexa and Tanner, as the Respondents on appeal, entitled to costs and attorney 
fees on appeal pursuant to IDAHO APPELLATE RULES 40 and 41? 
10 
HI. ARGUMENT 
A. IDAHO COURTS HA VE JURISDICTION TO DECIDE OWNERSHIP AND 
CONTROL OF IDAHO LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, DESPITE A 
DFCEASED MANAGER/MEMBER'S ESTATE ALREADY BEING PROBATED 
ELSEWHERE. 
Melanie argues that Idaho courts cannot decide ownership and control of an Idaho LLC 
because Jim resided in Utah, where his estate was being probated when this action was started. 
This action is not to probate and decide who shall receive whatever Jim's interest in the LLC 
may turn out to be. Rather, this action is to determine the prerequisite question: whether Jim 
(and now his estate) owns l %, 50% or 75% of the LLC. 
Whatever is finally determined, judicially, here in Idaho as to what percentage of the 
Idaho LLC that Jim owned on his death, it will be for the Utah probate proceeding to determine 
vvho shall succeed to Jim's LLC percentage in light of his last will and testament and Utah 
probate law. This Idaho case in no way intrudes into the domain of the Utah probate proceeding. 
In fact the Utah probate comi has, in light of Utah Code §75-3-804, ordered its matters as relate 
to the LLC (and properties owned by it) stayed until this Idaho action is finally resolves what 
percentage of the LLC was owned by Jim when he died. 
J. The General Jurisdiction of Idaho Courts Includes Jurisdiction to Determine Who Are 
the Rightful Owners, Members and Managers of an Idaho LLC 
Idaho's district courts have general subject matter jurisdiction, having original jurisdiction 
in all cases and proceedings. J.C.§ 1-705(1). The U.S. Supreme Court faced a jurisdiction issue 
in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co, 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950), as well as the 
well-known issue of service of process. There, a trust existed under New York law. The 
11 
states. U.S. a\vay a 
challenge, explaining that 
and 
"the interest of each state in providing means to close a trust that exist by the 
grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision of its courts is so 
insistent and rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt the right of its courts 
to determine the interests of all claimants, resident or nonresident, provided its 
procedure accords full opportunity to appear and be heard." 
"the vital interest of the State in bringing any issues as to its fiduciaries to a final 
settlement can be served only if interests or claims of individuals who are outside 
of the State can somehow be determined. A construction of the Due Process 
Clause which would place impossible or impractical obstacles in the way could 
not be justified." 
The same is true ofldaho's vital interest with respect to an LLC that exist by the grace of 
Idaho law and settling questions about its ownership and management. 
Melanie filed the June 10, 2013 Annual Report, R. 439, for the LLC with the Idaho 
Secretary of State. She tried thereby to assert LLC membership status and management rights to 
which she has no legal right. She was attempting to avail herself of Idaho laws and protections. 
are no process concerns that limit Idaho's courts 
matkr over 
Even as to choice of laws, Idaho's or Utah's, the internal affairs doctrine (a choice 
laws rule) applies in favor of Idaho law applying. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
§302, comment b, pp 307-308 (1971 ). "[O]nly one State should have the authority to regulate a 
corporation's internal affairs-matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the 
corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders-because otherwise a corporation 
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See § 
Comment b, pp. 307-308 (1971)." Edgar v. MITE Corporation., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (l 982). 
2. In Deciding to Retain the Case Despite the Utah Probate Proceedings, the District 
Court Perceived the RULE 12(b)(8) Issue as One of Discretion and the Proper Factors 
and Standards to Consider, and Explained its Reasoned Application of that Discretion 
in the Context of Those Standards 
At the time this Idaho action was initiated, who rightfully owns the 99%, are the LLC's 
members and is the LLC's manager were not at issue or otherwise implicated in the Utah probate 
proceeding. They were first raised in this Idaho LLC action. Nothing about the Utah probate 
proceeding precludes these claims from properly proceeding and being litigated here, in this 
Idaho action. 
Accordingly, IDAHO RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(8) is inapplicable. It is not a tool to 
be used for forum shopping. It does not require dismissal of this Idaho action. Procedurally, it is 
the Utah probate proceeding that should defer and yield to this Idaho action of the ownership 
issue, which is precisely what the Utah court has so ordered. 
In reviewing a district court's application of RULE 12(b)(8), this Court has explained that 
The trial court's determination under T.R.C.P. 12(b )(8) whether to proceed with an action 
where a similar case is pending in another court is discretionary. See Zaleha v. Rosholt, 
Robertson & Tucker, Chtd., 129 Idaho 532,533,927 P.2d 925, 926 (Ct.App.1996). This 
decision will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court abuses its discretion. See 
id. When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
considers "(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; 
(2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) 
and whether the court reached its decision by an exercise ofreason." Id. (citing Sun 
Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 
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(I 
Klaue v. Hern, 133 Idaho 437,439, 988 P.2d 211,213 (1999). 
The district court noted on page 5 of the Opinion and Order Denying Respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss, February 27, 2014, R. 123, that determining ''under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8) 
whether to proceed with an action where a similar case is pending in another court" is 
discretionary by the district court. 
The district court also acted within the bounds of its recognized discretion, consistent 
with the standards applicable to the choices it was facing when it rejected Melanie's motion to 
dismiss. The district court, citing Klaue, 133 Idaho at 439, 988 P.2d at 213 (which in turn cited 
Diet Ctr., Inc. v. Basford, 124 Idaho 20, 22-23, 855 P.2d 481, 483-84 (Ct.App. 1993)), noted on 
page 5 of the Opinion and Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, February 27, 2014 
(R. 123) that the district court must-
a) evaluate the identity of the real parties in interest 
b) evaluate the degree to which the claims or issues are similar 
c) consider whether the other court is in a position to determine the whole controversy and 
settle all the rights of the parties 
d) take into account judicial economy, minimizing costs, delay to litigants, obtaining prompt 
and orderly disposition of each claim or issue and avoiding potentially inconsistent 
judgments. 
The district court reached its decision through the exercise of reason. It mentioned that 
Klaue favors that the court first acquiring jurisdiction being the one to retain it. Id. The district 
14 
are the same in 
litigation. 
The district court however noted that the Utah probate proceeding could only "decide 
some of' the issues presented in this Idaho LLC litigation. Id. at p 6, R. 124. The key question 
of who owns the LLC was "not at issue in the Utah probate proceeding. This [Idaho LLC] action 
is properly before the [Idaho district court] without undue conflicts with the Utah" probate 
proceeding. Id. at p 7, R. 125. 
The district court explained that if it dismissed this action, Adam, Alexa and Tanner 
would have to file these claims in the Utah probate proceeding. Utah law, however, permits the 
court there to refuse to review a denial of those claims by Melanie herself as the personal 
representative. Thus, some or all of the issues raised in this Idaho LLC action might not be 
addressed by the Utah court. Utah law, on the other hand, requires the probate court there to 
honor a judgment rendered by another state's courts. Thus, retaining this Idaho action is the only 
way the district court could assure that all the claims here would be heard by a court, without the 
potential for inconsistent outcomes. 
The district court amply detailed in its Opinion and Order Denying Respondent's Motion 
to Dismiss, February 27, 2014, R. 119-29, the reasons for deciding to retain this Idaho action. It 
explained how it reached that decision exercising its discretion, applying the appropriate legal 
standards. 
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B. JOHNNY SLAVENS PROPERLY HELD THE 99% AND WAS AN 
MEMBER UNDER THE IDAHO LIMITED LIABILITY COMP ANY ACT 
FROM THE INCEPTION. 
As this Court explained on January 22, 2016 in Humphries v. Becker, Docket No. 41897, 
2016 Opinion No. 5, 
On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court utilizes the same 
standard ofreview used by the district court originally ruling on the motion. Summary 
judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." T.R.C.P. 56(c). When 
considering whether the evidence in the record shows that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and draw all reasonable 
inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party. Golub v. Kirk-Hughes Dev., LLC, 158 Idaho 
73, 75-76, 343 P.3d 1080, 1082-83 (2015) (quoting Connerv. Hodges, 157 Idaho 19, 23, 
333 P.3d 130, 134 (2014)). 
Melanie admitted that the unsigned Operating Agreement document correctly reflects 
Jim's desires for the LLC, at least until late April 2011. Deposition of Melanie Ann Slavens, 
P54, L1 O-P55, L2, R. 205. (Only since her deposition has Melanie argued against that Operating 
Agreement, that it is hearsay.) The Operating Agreement makes clear that Johnny held the 99% 
"ownership interest" and was an LLC member. (Melanie now tries to create confusion claiming 
there is a 'vagueness' in the commonly if not universally understood synonymous LLC 
terminology: "ownership" and "interest".) 
In fact, in her initial affidavit Melanie testified that Johnny had "dissociated" in 2011. 
Affidavit of Melanie Slavens in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, September 
16, 2014, 1115 and 16, R. 304. The implication is that before the alleged 'dissociation', Johnny 
was involved as a member. 
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court on L 
died. Melanie quickly changed her story, factually. Barely two weeks later, she began claiming 
that she and Jim always held 50% of the LLC each, and Johnny never held any interest in the 
LLC. Melanie signed and submitted another, Supplemental Affidavit of December 15, 2014, 
R. 421-26, setting forth the new facts contradicting those to which she had already testified. 
The LLC was formed in 2005 when the IDAHO LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT (Chapter 
6 of Title 53 of the IC.) applied. It was then and under that ACT that Johnny came to hold the 
99% and became an LLC member along with Jim. One became a member of the LLC then 
either as provided in a written operating agreement or upon consent of all members. J.C. §53-
640(l)(a) or §§53-640(l)(b) and -638(a) (2005), respectively depending on whether the LLC 
interest came directly from the LLC or was assigned from a prior holder of it. 
An operating agreement was, in 2005, "any agreement, written or oral, among all of the 
members as to the conduct of the business and affairs of a limited liability company." J.C. §§53-
601 (11) (2005). The newer IDAHO UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT (now Chapter 25 of 
Title 30 of the Idaho Code) has applied to this LLC since July I, 2010. J.C. §30-6-1104(2). The 
newer UNIFORM ACT recognizes not only written and oral operating agreements, but also those by 
implication or a combination of written, oral and/or implication. J.C. §30-25-102(a)(9). (Note, 
the briefing and orders below in the trial court refer to sections of Chapter 6 of Title 30; in the 
meantime, the statutes have been moved into Chapter 25 of Title 30, with some subparts re-
numbered.) 
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attests as a 
theLLC-
Q. (BY MR. SIMMONS) The Exhibit 5.1 is the operating agreement. Have you had an 
opportunity, Melanie, to read it in this litigation? 
A. Um-hmm. Yes, I have. 
Q. Thank you. Did you see anything in there that was contrary to what you 
understood was Jim's desires with respect to the LLC? 
A. Initially, no. 
Q. You say, "Initially, no," but since that initial impression, has anything come up? 
A. Oh, when I say initially, because apparently this operating agreement was drafted in 
2005 when the discussions were had, you know, and the decisions were made to put the 
Kuna property in the Twin G Holdings. After the fact, after this [April 21-23, 2011] e-
mail conversation and after the addendum was returned to our office and to Jim, 
then, yeah, things changed. So this was not his understanding nor mine. 
Deposition of Melanie Ann Slavens, June 18, 2014, P54 Ll0-P55 L2, R. 205 (emphasis added). 
There, Melanie testified that the unsigned Operating Agreement accurately reflected 
Jim's desires for the LLC from its formation in 2005 through at least April 23, 2011. That 
document specifies that Johnny has been an LLC member and has held the 99% since before the 
original Articles of Organization were filed in June 2005. Melanie's testimony is, therefore, that 
Johnny in fact held the 99% and was an LLC member. 
In Article VI on page 6 of the main body of the Operating Agreement document, it refers 
to Exhibit "A" for the names and addresses of the members, R. 159. Exhibit "A" specifies that 
Johnny both has a 99% "Ownership Interest/Sharing Ratio" and is a member, R. 177. There is 
also a signature spot for Johnny on p. 19 (R. 172) for him to sign as one of the members. In fact, 
that Operating Agreement specifies the members per that document (Jim and Johnny) to both be 
organizing members: "The Members hereby agree to organize the company as an Idaho limited 
liability company... . A Member shall execute and file the Articles of Organization with the 
18 
State on 3.01, 
4 (R. 157). "Effective Date" is defined as the date of filing the Articles of Organization with the 
Idaho Secretary of State." Glossary, page 21 (R. 174). 
(That document yet operates as the Operating Agreement for the LLC because it has not 
been revoked or amended by its terms (members unanimously, Article XVI, p. 17 (R. 170)) or 
unanimous agreement of the extant LLC members (J.C. §30-25-102(a)(9).) 
Melanie next testified (ifi!l 5 and 16 of her first affidavit, September 16, 2014) that 
Johnny had 'dissociated' himself from the LLC in April 2011. R. 304. The implication being 
that he had some association prior thereto from which he dissociated, confirming her deposition 
testimony that Johnny held 99% and was an LLC member. 
The district court ruled on November 30, 2014 that there had not been an effective 
transfer of the 99% away from Johnny before Jim died. Only then did Melanie pivot factually 
and contradict the facts to which she had already testified under oath twice. Just 15 days after 
the district court so ruled, Melanie signed and submitted her Supplemental Affidavit, R. 421-26, 
in which she conveniently testified that 
1. the Operating Agreement was never signed because Jim and Melanie had 
changed their minds (i!9, R. 423), 
11. she (Melanie) was "at all material times an equal member" of the LLC with Jim 
owning "the other one-half interest" (,r,r3 and 8, R. 422-23) 
iii. she never transferred or agreed to transfer her LLC membership to Johnny, "any 
trust, or any other party." (i!4, R. 422) 
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'\vas never a or manager. He had no 
R. 423) 
v. Johnny "has never been [an LLC] member, manager or other 'authorized person' 
... so as to amend the Certificate of Organization (i!6, R. 423)-despite the fact 
Melanie submitted the Johnny-signed 2011 Amended Certificate to the Idaho 
Secretary of State for filing. 
The district court explained why this was disingenuous of Melanie and not acceptable. 
'These statements are not allowed because they dramatically contradict her earlier affidavit 
testimony without justification". The district court continued that the new testimony "is not new 
fact, it is a change in fact" to support a newly found, different argument. Opinion, Decision, and 
Order Denying Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, May 21, 2015, specifically pp. 5 and 
7, R. 541 and 543, for further delineation of the troubling, inexplicable inconsistencies of her 
testimony. 
Under Melanie's new (contradictory) version of the facts, Johnny's signature on the 2011 
Amended Certificate would carry no authoritative weight. Melanie needed these new 'facts' to 
form a basis for Melanie's new arguments. She tries to attest that Johnny never became an LLC 
member and that neither Melanie herself nor Jim "gifted" the 99% to Johnny. It is these 
statements from Melanie's later, Supplemental Affidavit that the district court observed 
"dramatically contradict" her prior factual testimony. Litigants can certainly pursue alternative 
legal theories, but it would make a mockery of the fact finding function of courts if litigants were 
also allowed to testify to alternate versions of the facts to suit their personal interests. 
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new 
(at deposition and in her initial affidavit) that Johnny held that 99% and was an LLC member. 
Those two propositions are also attested to by (A) the Operating Agreement that Jim had 
prepared in 2005, (B) the opening recitals in the 'Addendum' that Jim drafted and sent to Johnny 
on April 21, 2011, (C) Jim asking Johnny to sign the 2011 Amended Certificate on April 22-23, 
2011, (D) the e-mail discussions over April 21-23, 2011 that includes several implicit references 
to Johnny's holding an interest in the LLC, and (E) Melanie's own act of submitting the Johnny-
signed 2011 Amended Certificate to the Idaho Secretary of State in the weeks after Jim died. 
Given the record evidence, it would not be reasonable for a jury to conclude that Johnny never 
owned that 99% or was never an LLC member in light of Melanie's previous testimony that he 
did. 
Melanie argues, without a single citation to any legal authority, that somehow the LLC's 
title, "Twin G Holdings, LLC" should mean that the 99% was not held by Johnny in the trust that 
Jim asked of Johnny. Although there is no evidence in the record, she claims in her Appellant's 
Brief that Jim's younger two children have been disinherited from the bulk of Jim's estate. 
However, the LLC does not include 24 of 30 properties in which Jim held interests directly or 
indirectly, nor the life insurance proceeds. It is improper for Melanie to argue the effect of the 
resolution of the legal issues on an estate. Ayers v Cook, Docket No. Sl5Al6I l, pp 3-7 (GA 
Supreme Court February 22, 2016) http:i/caselaw.findlaw.com/ga-supreme-court/1726656.html. 
Nor does Melanie's allegations about Jim's including the LLC's finances on his tax 
returns yield her anything. As a grantor trust, Jim was for tax purposes considered holding the 
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o/o the LLC. a it was appropriate be 
declared on a Schedule C to his Forms l 040. That Jim did does nothing to dispel the fact that, 
for legal purposes other than tax, Johnny was holding the 99% in trust as Jim had asked him. 
C. JOHNNY SLAVENS' TESTIMONY ABOUT JIM'S STATEMENTS ARE NOT 
EXCLUDED BY THE DEADMAN STATUTE OR AS HEARSAY. 
The standard of review by this Court with respect to summary judgments is as set forth 
under ITI.B. above. Also, on appeal, this Court exercises free review over issues of law. 
Hoagland v. Ada Cnty., 154 Idaho 900, 906, 303 P.3d 587, 593 (2013). The interpretation of a 
statute is a question of law that the Supreme Court reviews de nova. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 
863, 865, 264 P.3d 970, 972 (2011 ). 
There are three reasons that Idaho's Deadman Statute (J.C. §9-202(3)) does not block 
Johnny's testimony. One is that the testimony concerns the state of affairs or matters of fact that 
occurred before Jim died. Johnny's testimony is free of any suggestion that Jim made promises 
he did not fulfill. Two, there is documentary evidence corroborating Johnny's testimony about 
Jim's statements, i.e., the April 2 J -23, 2011 e-mail exchange to which Melanie has attested at her 
deposition, R. 197, 226-31. Three, Johnny's testimony runs counter to Melanie's claims that she 
owned 25% of the LLC. 
The Deadman Statute (I. C. §9-202(3)), since 1965. has and does read: 
Parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, or persons in whose 
behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted against an executor or administrator, 
upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any 
communication or agreement, not in writing, occurring before the death of such 
deceased person. 
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in Beguesse Inc 156 15, 
P.3d 480, 495 (2014), quoting Montgomery v. Montgome1y, 147 Idaho I, 8, 205 P.3d 650, 657 
(2009), that it has " 'not interpreted this provision so broadly as to bar testimony concerning a 
state of affairs or matters of fact occurring before a decedents death.' " See also Matter of Estate 
of Keeven, 110 Idaho 452,460, 716 P.2d 1224, 1232 (1986). 
Johnny's declares what factually transpired before Jim died. Johnny's testimony goes to 
what took place in the spring of 2005, Jim's actions in setting up the trust and then in the spring 
of 2011, concerning Johnny's sending the signed 2011 Amended Certificate to Jim. Johnny's 
testimony is about his intentions when he sent the 2011 Amended Certificate to Jim. It is about 
the context as framed by statements exchanged between them in the days before Johnny sent the 
2011 Amended Certificate to Jim. All of Johnny's testimony goes to the 'state of affairs', what 
occurred before Jim died. None of it alleges a promise, fulfilled or not, that Jim made. 
In Argyle v. Slemaker, 99 Idaho 544, 585 P.2d 954 (1978), the Deadman Statute was held 
not to bar claimants from testifying that a deed they delivered had no description of the subject 
property. This Court explained its 1978 Argyle holding thusly: 
The deed itself clearly existed and this Court merely refused to read LC. §9-202(3) so 
broadly as to exclude appellant's testimony as to the state of that deed's description upon 
delivery. Such testimony was not a 'communication or agreement' within the meaning of 
the Deadman Statute. We said, 'T.C. §9-202(3) does not bar testimony concerning a state 
of affairs or matters of fact occurring before decedent's death.' [Argyle] at 547,585 P.2d 
at 957. 
Estate of Keeven, 99 Idaho at 552, 716 P.2d at 1232. 
The 2011 Amended Certificate clearly existed, just as did the deed in Argyle, before the 
decedent died. Johnny's testimony goes to facts and circumstances surrounding the trust created 
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goes to 
the limitations when Johnny sent the 2011 Amended Certificate to Jim. Johnny testified that he 
limited its use to Jim and Jim only. 
Also, the Deadman Statute does not exclude witness testimony if, as here, there is 'written 
evidence to substantiate the alleged agreement'. Estate of Keeven, 110 Idaho at 460, 716 P.2d at 
1232 ( cited favorably for this proposition by the Idaho Supreme Court in Montgomery, supra). 
The written substantiation is the e-mail exchange between Jim and Johnny on April 21-23, 201 I, 
i.e., Exhibit 4 to the Deposition of Melanie Ann Slavens, PIO, L2I-PI l, L4, R. 197, 226-31. It is 
replete as written corroboration and substantiation of the dialogue as Johnny explains it in his 
testimony. 
Even if the applicability of the Deadman Statute could clear those two hurdles, there is a 
third road block to its application. Johnny's testimony about communications or agreements with 
Jim does not only impact Jim's estate, but also Melanie's personal claim to own 25% (or 50%, 
depending on when and for which purpose Melanie has found convenient in the moment to 
testify). That makes the Deadman Statute inapplicable. Beguesse citing Rowan v. Riley, 139 
Idaho 49, 54, 72 P.3d 889, 894 (2003), and Argyle v Slemaker, 99 Idaho 544, 585 P.2d 954 
(1978). 
Melanie argues Farrell v. Mc Vey, 71 Idaho 339,232 P.2d 134 (1951). That case does not 
block Johnny's testimony. In Farrell, a third party was trying to impress a trust over realty titled 
simply in the decedent's name per an alleged unfulfilled promise by the deceased. There was 
nothing to corroborate the claim. Here, there is the 2005 Operating Agreement Jim had prepared 
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as a as 
April 21-23, 2011 that acknowledged Johnny's 99% ownership interest and LLC membership. 
Johnny's testimony is not self-serving against the decedent as it was in Farrell. Johnny's 
testimony is about limitations Jim put on Johnny's 99% at the outset. Johnny's testimony is also 
about the condition that Johnny himself placed on his sending the 2011 Amended Certificate to 
Jim. 
Johnny's testimony about the terms of Jim's trust placed in Johnny re the 99% is not 
hearsay, but is testimony about a verbal act. State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 7004, 889 P.2d 729, 
733 (Ct.App. 1994). If it were hearsay, it is excepted. Johnny's testimony about Jim's terms and 
conditions for Johnny holding the 99% in trust is more probative on such than any other evidence 
that can be procured, given Jim's unavailability and its admission serves the interests of justice-
especially since it bears perhaps the most clear-cut badge ofreliability: against Johnny's interest 
if he were to claim a fee interest in the 99%. I.R.E. 803(24) and 804(b)(6). 
D. THE ORALTRUST HERE THAT JIMSLAVENS PLACED IN JOHNNY 
SLAVENS RE THE 99% IS LEGALLY VALID AND ENFORCEABLE. 
The standard of review by this Court with respect to statutory interpretation is as set forth 
under Part ULB. above. 
1. Ownership of an LLC is Personal Property. 
Idaho law does not require a writing for a trust to be valid when it pertains to personal 
property, such as ownership of an LLC. "A transferrable interest is personal property." I. C. §30-
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l, 2010 to I. 
Johnny in 2005 to hold personal property in trust. Then too limited liability company interests 
were personal property. J.C. §53-635 (2005). (Ownership of an LLC may, but is not required to, 
be "evidenced by a ce11ificate". l.C. §3U-25-502(d).) 
Melanie tries to strap the statute of frauds (specifically, J.C. §§9-503 and 9-505) across 
these clear legislative expressions as to what constitutes an LLC's operating agreement (J.C. 
§30-25-I02(a)(9)) and contrary to this Court's clear jurisprudence that a trust can be validly 
created without a document. Neither the LLC (or an operating agreement for it) nor the trust Jim 
placed in Johnny necessarily had to continue for a year or more. The statute of frauds does not 
apply here. 
2. Idaho Law Recognizes Oral Trusts Over Personal Property. 
The statutes of frauds (J.C. §§9-503 and 9-505) that require writings in certain 
circumstances do not apply to defeat an oral trust over personal property, the 99%. The Idaho 
Court of Appeals summarized in 1994 the necessary elements and various ways in which valid 
and legally enforceable trusts may be created, including express, oral trusts for which there is no 
instrument. In Estate of Hull v. Williams, 126 Idaho 437, 443, 885 P.2d 1153, 1159 (Ct.App. 
1994), it was explained that 
An express trust in personal propertv may be established bv expression of 
the parties either orally or in writing. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 
§24. A trust is created only if the settlor properly manifests an intention to create 
a trust. Garner v. Andreasen, 96 Idaho 306, 308, 527 P.2d 1264, 1266 (1974); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §23. This manifestation of intent 
need not incorporate any specific language, and the intent may be expressed by 
written or spoken words or bv conduct. Id §24. There must be certainty, however, 
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as to to to 
the manner in which the trust fund is to be administered and used. Bliss v. 
Bliss, 20 Idaho 467,476, 119 P. 451,454 (1911); [I George Gleason Bogert, THE 
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES], §45 at 483 [(Revised 2d ed. 1984)]. 
See also Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 379 146 P.3d 639, 645 (2006), as well as 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§20, 22, 23 and 24. 
3. The Trust Here Meets the Four Requirements for Validity. 
Johnny testifies as to each of the four requirements set forth in Estate of Hull v. Williams, 
supra. 1st Affidavit of John C Slavens (il 11, R. 148). Even if Johnny were asserting ownership 
for himself (he is not), Adam, Alexa and Tanner would prevail here in impressing a trust over 
Johnny's holding that 99% for their benefit once Jim died. 
First, Johnny identifies Jim as the settlor, who intended to create a trust with Johnny to 
hold the 99%. ,r11 of I st Affidavit of John C Slavens, R. 148. 
Second, the trust property is certain. It is the 99%. Id. 
Third, the beneficiaries are certain: Jim before he died; Adam, Alexa and Tanner in in 
equal Y.; shares of the remainder after Jim died. Id. 
Fourth, Johnny was to hold the 99% for Jim while he lived, then distribute it to to Adam, 
Alexa and Tanner in equal Y.; shares after Jim died. Id. 
E. JOHNNY SLAVENS YET HELD THE 99% IN TRUST WHEN JIM SLAVENS 
DIED BECAUSE JIM DIED NEVER HAVING USED THE SIGNED 2011 
AMENDED CERTIFICATE AS REQUIRED BY JOHNNY. 
The standard of review by this Court with respect to summary judgments is as set forth 
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1. Johnny Slavens Sent the Signed 2011 Amended Certificate to Jim Slavens With the 
Intent that It Not Then Operate to Transfer the 99%, and Jim Died Never Having Used 
It, Never Having Triggered the Transfer of Ownership. 
Johnny signed and sent the 2011 Amended Certificate (Exhibit 7, R. 234) to Jim in late 
April 2011. Johnny conditioned delivery, in the legal sense, on Jim, and Jim alone, perhaps 
using the 2011 Amended Certificate. Jim had it placed in his personal files, but died without 
ever having used it. Delivery in the legal sense was never completed; the 99% was not 
transferred from Johnny. Johnny continued to hold the 99% under the trust. Melanie never 
became a manager of the LLC, nor an LLC member. 
Since 1908, this Court has recognized that a transfer of ownership does not occur until 
delivery of the transfer instrument ( e.g., a deed or here, the 2011 Amended Certificate) has been 
made "with intent that it shall operate. The intent with which it is delivered is important. This 
restricts or enlarges the effect" of the instrument. Garrett v. Garrett, I 54 Idaho 788, 791, 302 
P.3d 1061, 1064 (2013), citing Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 344, 179 P.3d 303, 307 
(2008), which in turn cited to Bowers v. Cottrell, 15 Idaho 221, 228, 96 P. 936, 938 (1908). 
Simply signing and sending the signed 2011 Amended Certificate to Jim did not of themselves 
transfer ownership of the 99%. Johnny must have intended such to 'operate' then and at that time 
as a transfer. He did not. 
"'[D]elivery' and 'intent to convey immediately' are synonymous terms." Barmore, 145 
Idaho at 345, 179 P.3d at 308. Johnny's sending the signed 2011 Amended Certificate to Jim did 
not, in the legal sense, "deliver" it. Johnny did not intend that ownership of the 99% transfer at 
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sent to sent it to so that alone, 
perhaps use it to restructure his estate planning to make sure Adam, Alexa and Tanner received 
the 99% and/or Jim could use it to avoid the 99% becoming subject to Johnny's estate, if Johnny 
died yet holding the 99%. 
"The real test of the delivery of[the 201 I Amended Ce1iificate] is this: Did [Johnny] by 
his acts or words, or both, intend to divest himself of [ownership]? If so, the [2011 Amended 
Certificate] is delivered. Estate of Skvorak, 140 Idaho 16, 21, 80 P.3d 856, 861 (2004)." 
Barmore, 145 Idaho at 344-45, 179 P.3d at 307-08, and Garrett, 154 Idaho at 781, 302 P3d at 
1064. SeealsoFlynnv. Flynn, 17Idaho 147,160,104 P. 1030, 1034 (1909). 
"The question of delivery is one of intention, and the rule is that a delivery is complete 
when there is an intention manifested on the part of' Johnny to effect transfer of ownership of 
the 99% upon his sending the signed the 2011 Amended Certificate to Jim. Barmore, 145 Idaho 
at 344, 179 P.3d at 307. It is Johnny's intention "as to what is conveyed and when delivery 
occurs [that] controls." Estate of Skvorak, 140 Idaho 16, 21, 80 P.3d 856, 861 (2004). Johnny's 
testimony is unequivocal and uncontradicte that in sending the signed 2011 Amended Certificate 
to Jim, Johnny did not intend to transfer the ownership then. 
Johnny did send the signed 2011 Amended Certificate directly to Jim, a putative 
transferee. That raises a presumption that complete delivery was intended. It is rebutted by 
evidence that Johnny did not intend to make a present transfer, that ownership would only 
transfer if and when Jim might use that document. Barmore, 145 Idaho at 344, 179 P.3d at 307; 
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302 P.3d at 1064. 
"The intent to deliver is shown by 'the circumstances surrounding the transaction.' 
Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 68 Idaho 4 70, 4 76, 199 P2d 264, 267 (1948)." Garrett, 154 Idaho at 782 
, 302 P.3d at 1065. As delivery is necessary, "any evidence is admissible if it indicates the 
absence of delivery." Barmore, 145 Idaho at 345, 179 P3d at 308, and Garrett, supra. Evidence 
about the "delivery must come from" outside the 2011 Amended Certificate itself. The transfer 
document "never shows upon its face nor by the terms thereof a delivery, and parol evidence 
thereof must necessarily be admitted when the question of delivery arises. Whitney v. Dewey, 10 
Idaho 633, 655, 80 P. 1117, 1121 (1905)." Barmore, supra, and Garrett, supra. 
Johnny's testimony is corroborated by the circumstantial evidence. There is the e-mail 
that was part of the conversation between Johnny and Jim from April 21-23, 2011 (Exhibit 4 to 
the Deposition of Melanie Ann Slavens, PIO, L21-Pl 1, L4, R. 197, 226-3 l). 
Melanie admits that she does not know what all Jim and Johnny discussed by phone in 
those three days. Deposition of Melanie Ann Slavens, P2I, Ll 1-P22, L3 (R. 198-99); P28, L20-
P29, Ll8 (R. 200); P30, L24-P3 l, Ll8 (R. 201); P37, L22-P39, Ll 7 (R. 202-03); PI28, L25-
P129, Ll 1 (R. 217); P130, L14-Pl3I, L17 (R. 218) and Pl33, L3-P134, Ll3 (R. 218-19). She 
only overheard Jim's end of some of those phone calls. She has repeatedly declared that she has 
'no way of knowing or ascertaining' information about the condition Johnny imposed when he 
sent the signed 2011 Amended Certificate to Jim. Melanie's verified Responses to Requests for 
Admission ##5, 6 and 14, R. 244-246. 
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was estate 
purposes, to make sure Jim's children received it. Jim explained he would "figure something else 
out", given that "there are lots of ways" to make sure his children would receive it. There is 
however no evidence that in the ensuing 19 months to Jim's death that he did so. 
Jim asked Johnny to sign and "return", to "send" back to Jim the 2011 Amended 
Certificate. Jim explained that if he had it as signed by Johnny, Jim would not need Johnny to 
sign anything in the future. Nothing in the e-mail from Jim suggests a date when he thought the 
transfer of the 99% by the signed 2011 Amended Certificate would occur. Whenever it might be 
so used by Jim, Johnny would be 'out of' of the LLC. Johnny sent the signed 2011 Amended 
Certificate to Jim on the condition that it was for Jim's possible use only. 1st Affidavit of John C 
Slavens, 1115, 17 and 27, R. l 49-51. That tied the effectivity of the 2011 Amended Certificate 
to the use of it by Jim. He never used it. The 2011 Amended Certificate never became effective. 
Thus Johnny continued to hold the 99% in trust until Jim's death and beyond. Johnny continued 
to hold the 99%, now in trust for Adam, Alexa and Tanner. 
2. Jim Slavens Did Not Use the 2011 Amended Certificate Before He Died; Johnny 
Slavens' Condition on Delivery Failed of Impossibility; Johnny Continued to Hold the 
99% and Melanie Never Became a Manager (nor Member) of the LLC. 
There is no evidence or indication of Jim having used the signed 2011 Amended 
Certificate in the 19 months he held it before he then died. Jim recorded quit claim deeds to the 
Delta farm within two weeks of his 3-day phone and e-mail conversation having ended on April 
23, 2011, transferring the Delta farm into the LLC. Jim however never filed the 2011 Amended 
Certificate with the Idaho Secretary of State. Had Jim filed it, that would have registered 
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as manager In 19 2011 
Jim never did so that. 
Jim did not list Melanie as a manager on either of the two annual reports he filed with the 
Idaho Secretary of State in those 19 months. Nor did Jim use it in November 2011 to prove to 
Juab Title that he had authority to sign for the LLC. Melanie pithily explains: "I wasn't the 
manager; he was." Deposition of Melanie Ann Slavens, P75, LI 5, R. 210. 
In October 2012, Jim retitled his Fillmore residence from just himself to him and Melanie 
with rights of survivorship, so that she alone would own his Fillmore residence after he died. 
Despite being in an estate planning frame of mind, Jim did not then use the signed 2011 
Amended Certificate to restructure his estate planning as to the 99%. 
Melanie concedes she has 'no way of ascertaining' whether Jim had used the signed 2011 
Amended Certificate before he died. Melanie's verified Responses to Requests for Admission 
##7, 11, 13 and 19, R. 244-45 and 247. Nothing indicates Jim ever used the signed 2011 
Amended Certificate. He never fulfilled the condition Johnny placed on delivery. With Jim died 
the possibility that Johnny's condition could be fulfilled. Nothing triggered the transfer of 
ownership of the 99% away from Johnny. Consequently, Johnny continued to hold the 99% 
until Jim died and afterwards. 
Johnny fulfilled his promise to Jim and the trust that Jim placed in Johnny. After Jim 
died, Johnny distributed the 99% to Adam, Alexa and Tanner (specifically, 33% to each of them) 
on August 15, 2013. Exhibit JCS-4 to the 1st Affidavit ofJohn C Slavens (R. 151 and 182-85). 
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and court 
entered summary judgment declaring that Adam, Alexa and Tanner each own 33% of the LLC. 
1 I, Judgment (R. 573-75). 
3. Melanie Slavens Has Never Legally Been a Member of the LLC. 
Jim was an LLC member from the LLC's inception in June 2005. So too was Johnny. 
See discussion above in Part Ill.B. From that time, Jim held 1 % of the "transferrable interest" 
(IC. §30-25-102(a)(l l)) of the LLC, and Johnny the other 99%. 
Jim's estate succeeded to the 1% he was holding when he died. Jim's estate does not 
however succeed to Jim's LLC membership. J.C. §30-25-502(a)(3)(A) specifies that the estate is 
not entitled to "[p ]articipate in the management or conduct" of the LLC's activities. Neither the 
estate nor the personal representative acquires the decedent's membership or any other right to 
be a member or to become one. 
Assignees of LLC interests are generally entitled to distributions of profits from the 
ongoing business operations and investments. So too are assignees entitled to receive a portion 
of assets on termination of the LLC. J.C. §§30-25-502(b) and (c). In addition, a successor estate 
has the right to information about the LLC, but only as needed by the personal representative 
"for the purpose of settling the estate." See I. C. §§30-25-504(2) and 30-25-41 O(g). 
Had Jim used the signed 2011 Amended Certificate and it became effective, Johnny 
would have nevertheless remained a member of the LLC. J.C. §30-25-502(g). Had that 
happened, Melanie would own 25% and have become a manager, but not a member of the LLC. 
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a manager of the LLC, as managers need not be LLC members. J.C. §30-25-407(c)(5). 
Since Jim's death, Johnny continued as the only member of the LLC. Johnny has not 
done or said anything that would admit Melanie as a member of the LLC. She has never become 
a member, despite the fact she so arrogated and listed herself as a "member" on an annual report 
for the LLC that she filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on June 10, 2013, R. 422 and 439. 
The district court correctly entered summary judgment declaring that Melanie is not and 
never has properly become a member of the LLC. 1 II, Judgment (R. 573-75). 
4. Melanie Slavens Has Never Legally Been an LLC Afanager; Adam, Alexa and Tanner 
Slavens are the Only Members and Adam the Only Manager of the LLC. 
Johnny was the only member of the LLC after Jim died. Only Johnny could select and 
appoint managers for the LLC. J.C. §30-25-407(c)(4). As Jim never himself used the 2011 
Amended Certificate and it thus failed of delivery, Johnny has never done or said anything that 
would select Melanie as a manager for the LLC. That is, Melanie has never been selected by the 
membership of the LLC to be a manager. 
The 2011 Amended Certificate never took effect. Melanie also admits to filing the 2011 
Amended Certificate signed by Johnny without his authorization (Melanie's verified Responses 
to Requests for Admission ##23 and 24, R. 248). She signed a June 10, 2013 annual report for 
the LLC as "Managing Member", R. 422 and 439. These bootstrap attempts by Melanie never 
legitimized her claim to be a manager of the LLC. 
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summary that is not 
never has properly become manager of the LLC. 1 II, Judgment (R. 573-75). 
Following Jim's death on December 12, 2012, Johnny was the only LLC member. 
Johnny appointed Adam as the LLC's manager (J.C. §30-25-407(c)(4)). Johnny admitted Adam, 
Alexa and Tanner as LLC members. Johnny then resigned his own membership. All on August 
15, 2013. Exhibit J CS-4 (R. 151 and 182-85) to the 1st Affidavit of John C Slavens. 
Melanie attempts to raise a new issue on appeal. In her appellant's brief for the first time 
in this litigation, Melanie claims that the 2013 transfer of the 99% from Johnny to Adam, Alexa 
and Tanner, their admission to LLC membership and Adam's appointment as the LLC manager 
is not yet effective as they had not countersigned the document that Johnny signed to take those 
steps, at least not at the time a copy was attached as an exhibit to Johnny's affidavit. This is akin 
to the groundwater users' attempt to first argue on appeal the futility of the delivery calls at issue 
in Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 746, 152 P.3d 614, 617 (2007). This 
Court did not allow the groundwater users to do that. 
As this Court wrote on March 1, 2016 in Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dept. of 
Administration (2016 Opinion No. 22), it was when the appellant (like Melanie here) filed a 
motion for reconsideration below that the appellant had "an opportunity to present new or 
additional facts or materials but [Melanie] chose not to do so. In any event, [Melanie] had a 
'reasonably opportunity to present all material made pertinent.' I.R.C.P. 12(b)." Melanie did not 
take that opportunity incident to her motion to reconsider. She should not be allowed to raise 
this issue now for the first time on appeal. 
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if new Johnny owns 
the 99%, is the sole LLC member and it has no manger. It would not mean that Melanie or Jim's 
estate owns any part or all of that 99%. It would not make her an LLC member or manager. It 
would avail her nothing. 
The district court correctly entered summary judgment declaring that Adam, Alexa and 
Tanner are now the only members of the LLC, and Adam its only manager. 1 III, Judgment 
(R. 573-75). It was reiterated by the district court when it rejected Melanie's motion for 
reconsideration. These judicial declaration should stand despite Melanie's last-ditch attempt to 
raise this issue for the first time on appeal. 
F. ADAM, ALEXA AND TANNER SLAVENS REQUEST AND ARE ENTITLED 
TO COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
Adam, Alexa and Tanner request costs and attorney fees under IDAHO APPELLATE RULES 
40 and 41, respectively. This Court in Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 74-75, 785 P.2d 
634, 638-639 (1990), indicated that an award of attorney fees on appeal is appropriate when this 
Court is "left with an abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation" citing Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 
918, 591 P.2d 1078, 1086 (1979). (IDAHOAPPELLATERULE 11 is also implicated for the signer 
when a notice of appeal, brief or other appeal document is filed with this Court.) 
Melanie has brought and pursued this in the face of established Idaho law-
• on jurisdiction, without addressing Klaue v. Hern, supra, although she mis-argued it 
below. R. 96-97; 
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statute statute an to 
oral and/or implicit and her admitting that it reflects Jim's initial desires; 
• on the statute of frauds as to the trust, which could have ended within a year and this 
Court's clear jurisprudence allowing the creation of oral trusts; 
based only on her bootstrapping testimony that contradicts her earlier factual testimony. She 
proffers no explanation for the contradictions in her testimony. 
Melanie does this without citing to authority or giving any reason why this Court should 
ignore or limit the application of relevant statutes, reverse established precedence or find that the 
district court did not act reasonably, within its discretion-all the while admitting she has no 
evidence to rebut Johnny's testimony. 
This appeal appears to be little more than a continuation of Melanie's past tactics to delay 
the legal proceedings in the district court. The evidence is clear that Melanie usurped control 
and 'authority' over the LLC and its assets. She did so by filing the 2011 Amended Certificate 
with the Idaho Secretary of State a document for which she admits she did not have the 
permission from the signer (Johnny). She seeks to deprive the. She has and continues to put 
rightful owners, Adam, Alexa and Tanner, of that 99% and control of the LLC to considerable 
legal expense. Adam, Alexa and Tanner believe they will prevail on appeal and should be 
awarded attorney fees. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Adam, Alexa and Tanner ask this Court to 
1. affirm the district court's Opinion, Decision, and Order on Respondent's Motion to Strike 
and Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment of December i, 20 i 4 and Opinion and 
Order Denying Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of May 21, 2015, and 
2. award them costs and attorney fees on appeal as discussed in this Respondents' Brief . 
.iJ 
I 11 I 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on 3.21.2016 I caused to be properly served by the method specified in 
IDAHO APPELLATE RULES 20 and 34( d) the original and true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Respondents; Brief by properiy mailing them in the United States maii with postage prepaid, as 
so specified for each, to 
William A Parsons Esq 
Randolph C Stone Esq 
Parsons, Smith, Stone, Loveland 
& Shirley LLP 
PO Box 910 
Burley ID 83318-0910 
2 bound copies 
Clerk of the Court 
Supreme Court Building 
PO Box 83720 
Boise TD 83720-2210 
Bound original 
6 bound copies 
1 unbound, unstapled copy 
DATE CERTIFIED: March 21, 2016 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
The undersigned does hereby certify that the electronic brief submitted is in compliance with all 
of the requirements set out in I.A.R. 34.1, and that an electronic copy was served on each party at 
the following email address( es): 
William A Parsons Esq 
Parsons, Smith, Stone, Loveland 
& Shirley LLP 
wparsons@pmt.org 
I Clerk of the Court 
sctbriefs@idcomis.net 
DATE CERTIFIED: March 21, 2016 

